We exploit the timing of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the geographical variation in mortality risks individuals faced across states to analyze reproduction decisions. The results of a difference-in-differences approach show evidence that fertility increased in states that are geographically closer to Cuba and states with more military installations. The findings suggest that when facing high mortality risks, individuals might discount future at an extremely high rate and indulge in reproductive activities. [67 words] 
Introduction
Large-scale catastrophes such as wars or natural disasters are common in many parts of the world. Demographers and economists have long been interested in whether experiencing these man-made or natural disasters have an impact on human's reproductive behavior. However, the findings, primarily based on disasters with low mortality risks, are mixed so far. For examples, Pörtner (2008) and Evans, Hu & Zhao (2008) show that fertility decreases with hurricane and high-severity storm warnings, whereas Rodgers, John & Coleman (2005) and Trail & Borst (1971) find that fertility increased in Oklahoma County after Oklahoma City Bombing, in 1995 and in New York after the Japanese attacks on Pearl Harbor in 1941, respectively.
We exploit the timing of the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and the geographical variation in mortality risks individuals faced across states to implement a difference-in-differences (DD) strategy and estimate the effect of facing different degrees of mortality risks on general fertility rate. We find that on average, the Cuban Missile Crisis did not have an effect on fertility. However, states closer to Cuba and with a greater presence of military installations experienced surges in births 8-10 months after the Cuban Missile Crisis. For states that are far from Cuba, such as Washington and Oregon, general fertility rates decreased following the Cuban Missile Crisis. The findings suggest that individuals are more likely to engage in reproductive activities when facing high mortality risks, but reduce fertility when facing a high probability of enduring the aftermath of a catastrophe.
This paper contributes to the literature on the nexus between fertility, catastrophes, and mortality risks in several ways. Previous studies, such as Rodgers et al. (2005) and Trail & Borst (1971) that show positive birth effect of a violent event suggest the effect of experiencing the aftermath of a disaster, when the risk of death was no longer significant, rather than the effect of directly facing a catastrophe. Findings by Pörtner (2008) and Evans et al. (2008) that show reduced fertility following hurricane and high-severity storm warnings are more likely pointing to the birth effect of relocation. The current results add to our understanding of how reproductive behaviors vary with mortality risks by exploiting geographical variation in the degree of exposure to a likely large-scale catastrophe. This is crucial for identifying the different roles that the risk of mortality and the costs of recovery and relocation may play in influencing reproductive behavior. Specifically, the result of positive fertility effect when mortality risk is high is consistent with the literature on the effect of limited life expectancy, such as Oster, Shoulson & Dorsey (2012) , as individuals discount future heavily and indulge in leisure. On the other hand, when facing low mortality risks but high likelihood of experiencing the aftermath of a nuclear war, fertility falls given the anticipated cost of childrearing in a post-apocalyptic society. Finally, by focusing on the effect of facing extreme mortality risks on reproductive behavior, this paper extends the literature that examines the effects of changing life expectancy on economic growth (e.g. Acemoglu & Johnson (2007) , Kalemli-Ozcan (2002) , Lorentzen & Wacziarg (2008) , Soares (2005) , Weil (2007) , and Young (2005) ) and on human capital investment decisions (Jayachandran & Lleras-Muney (2009) and Oster et al. (2012) ).
The Cuban Missile Crisis
The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred between October 15 and October 28, 1962 and commenced with the discovery of Soviet missiles capable of transporting nuclear war heads on Cuba. As a response, the U.S. created an 800-mile quarantine zone around the island of Cuba and Navy ships were sent to block Soviet cargo ships to transport additional missiles to Cuba. On October 22, President John F. Kennedy revealed to the public about the threat of a nuclear war. On October 27, a U.S. reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba and the situation almost escalated. There is broad consensus among commentators that the Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the world came to a nuclear war with "a higher probability that more human lives would suddenly end than ever before in history." (Allison 1969, p. 669) . Some fractions of the U.S. population, especially those living closer to Cuba and in potential target cities, were expecting certain death if their cities were struck by the nuclear missiles. Given that the world was on the brink to a nuclear war, the potential outsight of living in a post-nuclear society meant for the remaining part only a marginal improvement.
Empirical Analysis
Our baseline DD specification takes the following form:
where Y itm is the outcome variable for state i year t and month m. Y denotes the general fertility rate for women aged 15 to 44. T reat m equals one if the fertility figures are from the months June, July, and August and zero if they are from the control months, March, April, and May. The treatment months are chosen under the assumption that most pregnancy lasts between 35 and 41 weeks. If reproductive behavior responded to the revelation of the crisis, then births would occur between June 24 and August 11. P ost t takes the value of one if the observation is from 1963 and 0 if the observation is from 1962. α i controls for time-invariant state specific factors and itm is the error term. While β 1 captures seasonal differences between the treatment and the control periods, β 2 reflects changes in the fertility between the years 1962 and 1963.The DD effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis between treatment and control months is captured by γ 1 . A positive sign indicates that the Cuban Missile Crisis had a boosting effect on fertility. This would suggest increased sexual activity during the weeks of Cuban Missile Crisis. A negative sign shows the Cuban Missile Crisis had an adverse effect on the reproduction decision. The baseline specification from equation 1 is extended by two triple interaction terms to allow testing for whether closeness to Cuba and being a missile target affects reproductive behavior as follow:
The first triple interaction term T reat m × P ost t × Dist i captures the effect of the risk of living closer to Cuba on birth. Dist i is the geographic distance between each U.S. mainland state and Cuba. The missiles stationed on Cuba (SS-4 "Sandal") had a maximum range of about 1,100 miles and could reach the District of Columbia. Had the worst occurred, this would have left people in the U.S. only with a few minutes to seek shelter and probably hit most targets unprepared. Thus, the closer is a state to Cuba, the greater is the risk of death and fertility effect. The second triple interaction term T reat m × P ost t × M il i captures the risk of being the target of Cuban missiles. M il i a measure of the prevalence of military presence in state i. We hypothesize that the birth effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis is likely stronger in places that are potential targets.
Data
We obtain data from several sources. First, live birth data between 1961 and 1963 by month and state of birth are drawn from the annual reports of Vital Statistics of the United States (Volume 1 -Natality). Second, we use the 1960 Census 1% micro sample sourced from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles, Alexander, Genadek, Goeken, Schroeder & Sobek 2010) to estimate women population aged 15 to 44 years in 1961, 1962, and 1963 . General fertility rates of childbearing age women are computed by dividing the number of live births by female population aged 15 to 44 years. Third, we obtain a GIS shapefile that contains polygons of the area of 465 military installations in the U.S. from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics and overlap these polygons with U.S. county boundaries using GIS.
Each county that had at least one military installation within its area is coded as a military county and zero otherwise. We then calculate the fraction of military counties within each state to obtain a proxy for the likelihood of being a target of Cuban nuclear missiles. To construct the distance between each state and Cuba, we first identify the distance between each U.S. county's centroid and the closest Cuban district's centroid. Then, we average these shortest distances across counties within each state. Finally, we exclude Alaska and Hawaii from the analysis as they have a high level of military presence and are outside the strike zones. Table 1 summarizes the variables used in this paper. Table 2 presents our main results of the effect of the Cuban Missile Crisis on state-level general fertility rates. The treatment variable is positive and statistically significant, indicating that in comparison to the control months, general fertility rates are higher in June, July, and August. Post yields a statistically significant and negative coefficient. The results in column 1 of table 2 show that birth rates in the treatment months in the following year were not systematically different from the control months. This suggests, that overall, the Cuban Missile Crisis did not have an impact on the general fertility rates in the U.S.
Results
General fertility rates do, however, differ once we take into account the riskiness of a state during the crisis. The coefficient of the interaction term between treatment and post-1962 variables is statistically significant at the 1% level and positive, while the triple interaction term between treatment, post, and the distance to Cuba is statistically significant and negative. Thus, general fertility rates increased in the treatment months after the crisis in states that are closer to Cuba. The farther away from Cuba the smaller is the increase. At a distance from Cuba that approximately corresponds to the state boundaries of New York or Kansas, the effect of the crisis becomes zero. General fertility rates eventually decrease in states located further north, west or north-west. The estimated coefficients in column 2 of table 2 suggest that the Cuban Missile Crisis led to a small increase of about 7 children per 1,000 childbearing-age women in southern Florida and a decrease of 5 children in the state of Washington. In column 3 of table 2 we add an additional triple interaction term that captures the effect of the treatment and post periods in states with a large fraction of military facilities. We find that general fertility rates increased even more in states with a higher density of military facilities. For example, Washington D.C. and Massachusetts observed an increase of 11 and 3 children per 1,000 childbearing-age women of 9 months after the Cuban missile crisis. The results suggest that individuals indulge in reproductive activities when facing high mortality risks, but reduce fertility when facing the possibility to 5 endure the aftermath of the impending catastrophe.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] It is possible that between-year fertility differences in the treatment and control months could be driven by other factors, such as a cohort trend in fertility. To check the robustness of our results we employ a placebo test where pre and post observations are taken from the previous years (1961 and 1962) . The results are presented in table 3. We find no systematic changes in general fertility rates between the treatment and control months in 1961 and 1962 and no effects for the interaction terms with distance to Cuba and fraction of military counties.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
We present some additional robustness tests in Table 4 . We first check whether our main results differ if we change the dependent variable to the log of births (column 1) while controlling for childbearing-age female population. Using specification 2 of Table 2 , we find a very similar pattern for the log of births. Total births increased in the treatment months after the crisis by about 7% in southern Florida, and decreased by about 6% in Washington State. The positive effect of military installations in this context could either stem from the increased risk of being a target of the first strike or from the fact that on average, more military personnel is in a given state. It is possible that the effect is driven by the reproductive behavior of members of the U.S. armed forces during the Cuban Missile crisis, as they were more exposed to information about the current events and thereby their awareness differed to the one of civilians. In column 2 of table 4 we use the fraction of military personnel in the total population instead of the fraction of counties with a military facility to construct the triple interaction term with military proxy. In column 3 table 4 we include both military variables. While the interaction with military personnel does not have a significant effect, the interaction terms with the other risk measures are still significant at least at the 5%-level. In the final robustness check, we test whether our results are sensitive to the choice of the treatment months. We again apply our preferred specification from column 2 of Table 2 , but use a shorter time span to define the treatment period, July and August instead of June to August, since the duration of pregnancy centers mostly around 38 weeks. The results in column 4 show that our results are robust and the estimated coefficients are even larger.
[ 
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether proximity to Cuba and military facilities affects reproductive behavior in the U.S. during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. We find that the closer to Cuba a state is and the greater presence of military facilities a state has, the higher is the general fertility rates in the state 9 months after the Crisis ended. The findings suggest that individuals discount future heavily and indulge in reproductive behavior when facing high-level mortality risks, but decrease fertility when facing a high probability of surviving a mega catastrophe. 7 
